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PERPETUITIES: A FATHER'S REPLY
Robert L. Fletcher
Susan has persuasively argued for adoption of a method that would
look at the various chains of events-the resolving sequences-thus to
separate those that fail from those that pass. We differ in only one
important respect. In some instances she would use a life or portion of
a life that is extraneous to the vesting reached in a particular sequence.
I would not. In doing so, she in effect adopts Professor Dukeminier's
"affecting lives" approach. To put this in my terms, she uses any life
or portion of a life that is pertinent to vesting of any sequence within
the interest, not confining herself to those lives that are pertinent to
the sequence under scrutiny. Further, she will use that extraneous life
even though it is not adequate to defend the other sequence. She also
would use a life that is adequate to defend a sequence that resolves the
remainder that is alternate to the remainder being tested.
This difference is apparent in her treatment of the Proctorcase ("To
the first son of A to become a clergyman," A having no sons at the
effective date). She would validate a sequence that gives the property
to an afterborn son who first becomes a clergyman, no matter at what
age, as long as he takes the cloth within 21 years of A's death, despite
the fact that A4' continued life after the birth of that son is extraneous.
Consider the sequence in which the only afterborn son (#1 son)
becomes a clergyman at age 30. Susan would say that this is defensible
ifA lives until the #1 son is 9 years old. As life, after the birth of # 1,
is usable since A could later produce #2 son (or #3 or #4), who
could become the first to become a clergyman. A being essential to
that other sequence at least long enough to get #2 born, his life until
that time is also usable to defend the sequence in which the first son
gets the prize at 30, #2 being born when #1 is 9 or older.
Assuming we are willing to use extraneous lives, this approach at
least has the virtue of using a definable group of people. But to my
mind it come uncomfortably close to the Restatement (Second)'s use of
many extraneous people-handy to have around, but intruders nonetheless. Further, they should be recognized for what they are-merely
a convenient mechanism for extending our tolerance of dead hand
control beyond the limits set by the common law rule.
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